The Partition of Somalia & the Politics of Destruction
There have been some thought-provoking pieces recently
on the balkanization or partitioning of Somalia. The
best of these pieces, in my opinion, have been Professor
Michael Weinstein’s “Kenya’s Premature Invasi ons of
Southern Somalia Stalls Balkanization” published in Garowe Online (http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Kenya_s_Premature_Invasions_of_Southern
_Somalia
_Stalls_Balkanization.shtml) and Abdishakur Jowhar’s
“The End of Somalia: Scenario of Partition” published in
Somalilandpress (http://somalilandpress.com/the-end-of-somalia-scenario-of-partition-25321).
Professor Weinstein’s piece is a methodical analysis of
the realpolitik motivations underlying the efforts of
Ethiopia and Kenya to establish statelets beholden to,
and dependant upon, them within Somalia and the
po litical trends within, and outside, Somalia supporting
or opposed to such efforts. Mr. Jowhar’s piece, on the
other hand, is the anguished and visceral cry of
opposition to these efforts, and the Somali political
actors that are, wittingly or unwittingly, supporting
them, that can only come from a Somali patriot who feels
the dismemberment of his country as deeply as wounds on
his body.
This is an important topic that needs to be addressed
seriously and both Professor Weinstein and Mr. Jowh ar
are to be commended for raising it in their inimitable
ways. However, it is necessary to define our terms in
order to bring clarity and transparency to the
discussion or debate. In this context, we have to ask
which “Somalia” is in imminent danger of being
partitioned or balkanized? Professor Weinstein’s article
is specific ally concerned with the potential partition
of south and central Somalia into fiefdoms and spheres
of influen ce controlled by Kenya and Ethiopia
respectively, thereby excluding Somaliland and Puntland
from the centr al thrust of its discourse (in the
interest of full disclosure, I should add that Professor
Weinstein and I have exchanged correspondence on his
piece). Mr. Jowhar’s piece also seems to have south and
central Somalia as its principal focus, in view of its
exposition of what it terms “state-lets” in that
territory and its concentr ation upon Kenya, Ethiopia, IGAD and UNPOS as the external actors militating and
scheming to effect partitio n.
The second term that needs to be examined and defined is
“partition”. We all know that, in this context,
par tition means political division, however the fact is
that the Somali people have been partitioned since the
18 84/85 Berlin Conference at which the European Powers
divided Africa between themselves. In the mode rn era,
the Allied victory in World War II set the parameters of
this division which has resulted in the partiti on of the
Somali people between independent Djibouti, a resurgent
Somaliland, the Somali state in Ethiopia (5th Province),
the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, and
south/central Somalia, within which the autono mous
region of Puntland has managed to avoid the anarchy and
state collapse prevalent in the rest of the erstwhile UN
Trust Territory administered by Italy. Thus, partition
is not new to the Somali people; indeed it has been a
feature of their political existence and reality since
their first contact with European imperialism at the end
of the 19th century. It’s not even new that it is
Ethiopia and Kenya that are scheming to partiti on Somali
people since both of these countries insisted upon
sovereignty over some of their Somali neighbo urs in 1959
and 1962 respectively. In both instances, Britain
acceded to the wishes of the Ethiopian and Ken yan
governments, and granted Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia what
is now termed the 5th Province in the first and
Kenyatta’s Kenya the NFD in 1962, in both cases against
the express wishes of the people of those regions and
contrary to the promises made by Britain to them.
Since the “Somalia” which is the focus of this
discussion is but one part of the territories occupied
by the So mali people and which forms the residual rump
of the erstwhile Somali Republic established in 1960 by
the un-ratified union between ex-British
Somaliland and
the ex-UN Trust Territory, and since partition has forme d the political reality of the Somali people since
the late 19th century, we are forced to ask, why is the
pres ent prospect of the partition of south/central
Somalia so noteworthy and different? Both Professor
Weinst ein and Mr. Shakur come to the same answer but
through different routes. The danger, as Professor
Weinst ein sees it, is that “The Somali people would be
deprived of a political community and their political
self-deter mination.”, while Mr. Shakur sees Somalia
reduced from nation to “a group of desperate wild tribes
each enti rely focused in a life and death struggle
against the neighbouring tribe.” Thus, both writers see
the dangers of the current potential partition of
south/central Somalia in terms of the eradication of
Somali nationalism and political self-determination.
Now we have reached the crux of the matter. As with all
analysis of Somali politics, we have to address the
issue of Somali nationalism and the fission-fusion
paradox that defines its very nature and essence. It is
not necessary to go into a lengthy analysis of Somali
nationalism (which I have undertaken under separate
cov er), but suffice it to say that since their first
experience of European colonialism, the Somali people
have res ponded with nationalist, religious and cultural
resistance. Modern Somali nationalism dating back to the
end of World War II was characterised by its pan-Somali
and irredentist focus with the goal of uniting all the
So mali people in one state – the Greater Somalia vision
that was endorsed and championed unsuccessfully by Aneurin Bevan (Deputy Leader of the British Labour
Party) prior to his death in 1960. This dream of Greater
Somalia developed in the heady days of anti-colonial
nationalism and the agitation it spawned, marks the
ze nith of the fusion strand of Somali nationalist ethos.
Indeed, the creation of the Somali Republic in 1960
thr ough the ill-fated union of British Somaliland and
Italian-administered Somalia was but the first st ep in
the realisation of this dream.
Unfortunately, there was a nightmare lurking within the
pregnant promises of the dream of Somali unity, an d this
evil first surfaced in the unequal and oppressive terms
of union exacted by the leaders of Italian-admi nistered
Somalia from their less experienced and more naïve
brethren of British Somaliland. When the union
constitution was put to them for ratification in 1961 in
a national referendum, more than two thirds of the
voting public in the ex-British Protectorate rejected
it, while a similar majority in the ex-UN Trust
Territory ratified it. Thus, did Somali nationalism and
politics begin to swing from the fusion pole at one end
of the spe ctrum towards the fission pole at the other.
This manifestation of fission in Somali politics and
nationalism reached its zenith during the final decade
of the Siyad Barre dictatorship when political power
became conc entrated in the hands of only one sub-clan,
with the inevitable result that the country fractured
along clan lines and descended into the anarchic madness
that continues to persist in south/central Somalia to
this day.
The only part of the erstwhile Somali Republic that has
managed to fashion a new model of politics, peaceful
co-existence and underlying rationale for allegiance to
a state across clan divisions is Somaliland, which has
developed a functioning, democratic system of government
rooted in local culture and traditions with a free and
robust press. This system can be used as a useful and
effective model by the people of south/central Somalia
to establish a state, but it cannot be imposed upon them
by any external actors, whether their inte ntions are
benign or malign. The simple and inescapable fact is
that the persistence of the fission tendency of Somali
politics in south/central Somalia, and the attendant
atomisation of society into vicious inter- and
intra-clan rivalries, is a legacy of the Siyad Barre
dictatorship that has been co-opted and exacerbated by
warlords, self-appointed ‘civil society leaders’,
Islamist militias and Diaspora carpet-baggers in search
of ea sy money and self aggrandisement. It is the ugly
and venal tribalism of this politics, and its
manipulations by external actors, that Mr. Jowhar
decries so emphatically and eloquently, and which
Professor Weinstein de-constructs so methodically.
The fact that the people of south/central Somalia have
reached the end of their patience with the anarchy that
has blighted their lives for so long, and the self
serving straw men masquerading as leaders that are
maintaining it, is evidenced by the repeated, but
unpublicised missions of tribal leaders from this
territory to Somaliland requesting its assistance in
facilitating genuine, Somali-sponsored and
Somali-driven, national rec onciliation. Supporting and
facilitating genuine, grass-root efforts at national
reconciliation among its broth ers to the south is a
moral, religious, humanitarian and fraternal duty that
Somaliland must and will dischar ge. It has always been
the conviction of many, including this author, that
national reconciliation in south/c entral Somalia can be
best achieved with the active support, sponsorship and
mediation of Somaliland. The proposals of successive
governments in Somaliland to play such role have been
repeatedly rebuffed by both the international community
and the self-appointed and self-serving leaders of
south/central Somalia, the very architects of its
misery! Quelle surprise, as the French would say!
The fact remains, however, that the evil which grips
south/central Somalia is not partition, nor is it the
des igns of Kenya and Ethiopia to carve out spheres of
influence within this territory. Rather, it is the
inability and unwillingness of the social, religious and
political leadership of the people of this territory to
voice a vis ion of politics beyond narrow clan allegiance
and partisanship, i.e. to transcend the fission
principle of Somali politics. Neither Kenya nor Ethiopia
is evil in pursuing its national interest vis-à-vis the
anarchy and violence across its borders – this is called
diplomacy and foreign policy. It is up to the people of
south/central Somali a to pursue their own enlightened
self interest and develop a modus operandi for peaceful
co-existence, rep resentative government rooted in their
own culture and effective institutions. Unfortunately,
the long suff ering people of this territory are
afflicted by the twin, linked plagues of a venal and
self-serving leadership and a disinterested
international community which has delegated
responsibility for them to the best harbin ger of inertia
known to man – a bloated and equally self-serving
bureaucracy.
In conclusion, I cannot but agree with Professor
Weinstein and Mr. Jowhar that partition of south/central
Somalia into ‘spheres of influence’ between Ethiopia and
Kenya, and that this process has not only commen ced, but
is already quite advanced. However, I believe that this
fact is not the disease, but rather one symp tom of an
underlying malaise which is destroying this territory
politically, economically and socially. The dise ase is a
corrupted polity characterised by venal politics and the
introverted, fissile nationalism that breeds and
sustains it. The root causes of the threat and reality
of partition lies within. I can only conclude with a
co-opting a line from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar “the
fault dear Messrs Weinstein and Jowhar lies not in Ke nya
and Ethiopia but in ourselves”. Until the politics of
destruction is eradicated from Somalia, its continu ed
misery is assured as is the potential and danger of
partition.
Ahmed M.I. Egal
26 December 2011 |
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