France obtained permission from Somaliland authorities
to use the abandoned U.S. base at Berbera
Time
to Hunt Somali Pirates
J.Peter Pham, PhD
Late last Monday evening, for the second time this year, France's
President Nicolas Sarkozy dispatched special operations forces into
the territory of the defunct Somali Democratic Republic to free
French citizens who had been hijacked by pirates off the dangerous
waters off the Horn of Africa. The next morning, in a pre-dawn
operation lasting just ten minutes, a team from the Commando Hubert
of the berets verts, the elite naval commandos, freed a French
couple, Jean-Yves and Bernadette Delanne, who had been kidnapped two
weeks earlier when their yacht, the Carré d'As IV, was seized by
pirates as it was passing through the Gulf of Aden en route to
France from Australia. The pirates holding the Delannes had been
demanding a $1.4 million ransom.Instead one pirate ended up dead and
another half dozen received a free trip to one of holding cells
belonging to the France's special counterterrorism court where they
will join six other Somalis captured by French commandos in April
after they hijacked the luxury sailboat Le Ponant and held its
thirty crew members hostage. The berets verts suffered no
casualties.
Several hours after the commando raid, in a speech from the Élysée
Palace in Paris, President Sarkozy noted that he ordered the rescue
when it became clear the pirates planned to take the hostages to Eyl,
a pirate base in the semi-autonomous northeastern Somali region of
Puntland, where "their captivity could have lasted months."
According to the French chief of state, "The world cannot accept
this. Today, these are no longer isolated cases but a genuine
industry of crime. This industry threatens a fundamental freedom,
that of movement and of international commerce."Citing the fact that
piracy in the Gulf of Aden had "literally exploded" this year with
more than fifty attacks so far this year and Somali pirates still
holding an estimated 150 hostages and more than a dozen ships,
mainly around Eyl, the president called the international community
to action against "this plague."
Yet barely 24 hours later, a Hong Kong-registered ship, the
25,000-ton Stolt Valor, which had been chartered by the Norwegian-Luxembourgish
Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group and bound for Mumbai, India, with
a chemical cargo, was seized with its crew of twenty-two, including
18 Indians, two Filipinos, one Bangladeshi, and one Russian. The
next day, Somali pirates hijacked the Greek-owned, Maltese
registered bulk carrier Centauri, which was carrying 26 Filipino
seamen and a load of 17,000 tons of salt to the Kenyan port of
Mombasa; the vessel was taken to southern Somalia which, as I
reported late last month, had come under the control of Islamist
forces with al Qaeda links. In a separate attack that same day, the
Hong Kong-registered Great Creation, which was traveling to India
from Tunisia, was also seized with its crew of 24 Chinese and one
Sri Lankan. On Sunday, another Greek-owned freighter, the
Bahamian-registered Captain Stephanos, was hijacked 250 nautical
miles off the Somali coast. As of the time this column is being
filed, there is no word on the fate of ship's crew of seventeen
Filipinos, one Chinese, and one Ukrainian.
That the attacks are increasing should come as little surprise. In
an interview with Der Spiegel last week, Germany ship owner Niels
Stolberg admitted that his Bremen-based firm, Beluga Shipping GmbH,
paid $1.1 million earlier this month to recover its $23 milllion
freighter, the Antigua and Barbuda-registered BBC Trinidad, which
had been hijacked while carrying pipes and other oil equipment from
Houston, Texas, to Muscat, Oman. With ship owners willing to pay
ransoms of more than $1 million for the release of their hijacked
vessels, Somali piracy in increasing in both frequency and
sophistication. Not only are the attacks the most lucrative economic
activity in Somalia these days, but the pirates are using at least
part of the ransoms they have collecting to upgrade their arsenals
in the hopes of landing even larger maritime prizes. The
authoritative shipping paper of record, Lloyd's List, warned last
week that "ransom paid to pirate raiders off Somalia could spiral to
$50 million this year, fueling copy cat attacks."
From being the occasional nuisance whose deadly potential I warned
about more than two years ago in the inaugural column of this series
when I reported on an incident of some pirates foolishly taking
Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Cape St. George and the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer USS Gonzalez 25 nautical miles off the Somali
coast, Somali piracy has, alas, burgeoned into an international
problem affecting literally dozens of countries around the globe.
Hijacked vessels currently being held in Somali ports include ships
flying the flags of China, Egypt, Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria,
Panama, South Korea, and Thailand. Captured seamen presently being
held for ransom by the pirates come from fifteen countries,
including Croatia, India, Italy, Pakistan, the Philippines, and
Russia. Insurance premiums for commercial shipping which must pass
through the Gulf of Aden have soared tenfold over the course of the
past year, adding yet another drag to the sluggish global economy.
Yet shippers have few options: the adverse impact on international
commerce of having to navigate all around the Cape of Good Hope,
which adds at least 4,500 miles to a voyage, could be even more
severe than the increased insurance costs.
Late last week the Round Table of International Shipping
Associations - an umbrella group that brings together the Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International
Association of Dry Cargo Ship-owners (Intercargo), the International
Chamber of Shipping/International Shipping Federation, and the
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko)
- jointed the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF) in a
joint appeal calling on the United Nations' International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to use its influence with the world body to
secure "real and immediate action against brazen acts of piracy,
kidnapping and armed robbery, carried out with increasing frequency
against ships in the Gulf of Aden, by pirates based in Somalia," a
challenge which the statement described as "in danger of spiraling
completely and irretrievably out of control." It should be recalled
that the shipping industry and union were hardly exaggerating the
potential risks: in addition to other commerce, some 11 percent of
world's seaborne petroleum - some 3.3 million barrels - must pass
through the very waters currently infested with the Somali pirates.
From the international security perspective, even more grave than
the danger to global maritime commerce, there is increasing evidence
that at least part of the proceeds from the piracy has gone to fund
the Islamist insurgency against the internationally-recognized, but
otherwise utterly ineffective, "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG)
of Somalia. The insurgent "Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia" (ARS) is spearheaded by al-Shabaab ("the Youth"), a group
with ties to al-Qaeda which was formally designated a "foreign
terrorist organization" by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
earlier this year (see my March 27th report). The latest
confirmation of what is at the very least tacit cooperation between
the Somali pirates and their terrorist counterparts were the reports
over the weekend that the Centauri was headed toward the
Islamist-controlled southern Somali coast, rather than to one of the
usual pirate havens in Puntland. Moreover, should the link between
Somali piracy and Somali Islamist terrorism ever mature beyond the
current marriage of convenience to achieve operational and strategic
synergies, then the real consequences of the maritime economic
warfare which I sketched out in concept two years ago will be truly
catastrophic.
And while the pirate gangs and, however indirectly, the ARS
insurgents have benefited from the attacks on shipping, the already
marginal existence of ordinary Somalis has deteriorated. The United
Nations World Food Programme (WFP) currently feeds some 2.4 million
of the approximately 6 million inhabitants of Somalia proper; by the
end of the year, the number of those totally dependent upon food
assistance is expected to grow by about 50 percent to more than 3.6
million as the region faces what WFP Executive Director Josette
Sheeran characterized Monday as "the worst humanitarian crisis since
1984," when over one million died in the Ethiopian famine. With
approximately 90% of that food aid moved by sea, the pirate attacks
threaten to cut off that vital lifeline. While the pirates have not
targeted WFP food shipments recently because of escort protection
provided by the Canadian Halifax-class frigate HMCS Ville de Québec,
the vessel is scheduled to end its three-month deployment and sail
home this coming weekend. As yet, no country has stepped forward to
take over the mission. The dire humanitarian situation is further
aggravated by al-Shabaab's warning last week against any aircraft
landing at Mogadishu's Aden Adde Airport, a threat backed by
intelligence that the terrorist group had taken delivery of a new
consignment surface-to-air missiles. As a result of the Islamists'
ban on flights, the only plane to come in all week was a Ugandan
military flight that slipped in last Friday to deliver supplies to
the Ugandan People's Defense Force contingent which makes up the
bulk of the woefully undermanned African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
peacekeeping force. In response, ARS forces pounded Mogadishu over
the weekend, shelling two AMISOM bases, the airport, and the city's
Bakara market; at least two dozen civilians were killed on Monday
alone.
What then, might be done to deal with the growing challenge of
Somali piracy?
First, commercial vessels need to be better prepared to protect
themselves. For now, commercial shipping should limit their risk by
navigating within the limits of Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA)
proclaimed late last month by the Commander, United States Naval
Central Command, and entrusted to the Combined Task Force 150
multinational effort originally set up to stop suspect shipping in
support of the war on terrorism. In the event they come under pirate
attack, vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden via the MSPA
corridor stand a greater chance of receiving assistance from
coalition ships maintaining a continual presence in the vicinity.
Some ship owners have also invested in alarm systems, close-circuit
television, electric fences, and even armed guards as measures to
counter the threat of being boarded, many have not. Nonetheless,
even if all ships deployed countermeasures, the merchant marine
cannot be turned into an armed fleet. Furthermore, with some attacks
being mounted more than 200 nautical miles from the Somali coast by
heavily armed pirates in ocean going vessels equipped with satellite
technology, there is a limit to the effectiveness of the standard
advice given to commercial shipping to avoid the coastline, keep
alert, and maintain speed. (See point six below.)
Second, given the large area within which the pirates now apparently
operate as well as their improved armaments and tactics necessitates
a strong naval response to sweep the international sea lanes clear
of the pirates. Since early this month the Royal Danish Navy has had
a combat support ship, HDMS Absalon in the Gulf of Aden as part of
the Combined Task Force 150 (the rotating command of the task force
handed over to a Danish officer, Commodore Per Bigum Christensen,
last Monday). The Absalon, however, has been spending more of its
deployment chasing pirates away from commercial shipping in the MSPA
than interdicting terrorist movements of men and materiel: this past
week, the frigate-type vessel was answering at least one distress
call a day. European Union (EU) foreign ministers meeting in
Brussels last Monday expressed their "serious concern about the acts
of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast" and decided to
establish a coordination unit tasked with supporting surveillance
and protection activities undertaken by individual member states.
The ministers also approved "a strategic military option for a
possible European Union naval operation." On Saturday, a press
release from the Spanish Defense Ministry announced that, in support
of the EU coordination unit, Madrid had dispatched a P-3 Orion
maritime reconnaissance plane and a Hercules helicopter, as well as
a Boeing 727 carrying support personnel, on a three-month deployment
to Djibouti, from where the aircraft will patrol the Somali coast.
Also over the weekend, the French Permanent Mission to the United
Nations was circulating a draft Security Council resolution calling
on "all states interested in the safety of maritime activities" to
"actively take part in the fight against piracy against vessels off
the coast of Somalia, in particular by deploying naval vessels and
military aircraft."
Third, while an international anti-piracy coalition as advocated by
the French is well and fine, it is effective; and it can only be as
effective as its components. While the unanimously passed UN
Security Council Resolution 1816 authorizes for a period of six
months beginning in June the naval forces of other countries to
enter Somali waters in pursuit of the pirates, that document
predicated the legal authority to do so on cooperation with the TFG.
The problem is that not only is the TFG no government, but it is
part and parcel of the problem. Last Friday, the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia, Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah, accused the rulers of Puntland of complicity in the
piracy, telling a press conference in Djibouti that "the Puntland
leadership has made it easy for pirates to establish a base there"
and alleging that some of ransom money collected would "be used to
fund the 2009 presidential elections in Puntland." What the
Mauritanian diplomat discretely omitted was that Puntland is the
stronghold of TFG "President" Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad's Darod clan and
the Majeerteen subclansmen who are his most loyal supporters enjoy a
disproportionately high representation in the ranks of the pirates.
One can only guess how many of the consumer purchases which TFG
chieftain is wont to make during frequent sojourns abroad are paid
for with misappropriated international funds that are supposed to
aid Somali civilians and how many are funded by the tribute payments
received by the old warlord from his pirate kinsmen (see this photo
posted on a Somali website - the very week it was taken in London
earlier this year, dozens of Somalis died in attacks in Mogadishu).
The TFG is likelier to be a hindrance than a help in taking the type
of strong action, both on land as well as in the water, which will
be needed if the pirate havens are to be destroyed once and for all
- statements like last week's declaration of support by the
International Contact Group on Somalia for the TFG's constantly
proliferating array of do-nothing committees to dialogue with the
toothless rump of the ARS that, having lost the internal power
struggle to more extremist elements, signed the so-called Djibouti
Agreement last month are little more than wishful thinking.
Fourth, in addition to eschewing entanglements with obstacles like
the TFG, it is imperative that ties be forged with effective
authorities capable of helping in the fight against piracy. While
pirates operate openly along most of the 2,285 kilometers of the
coastline in Somalia proper, none ply the 740 kilometers of Gulf of
Aden coastline belonging to the as-yet unrecognized Republic of
Somaliland. According to information first disclosed last Wednesday
by my friend Professor Iqbal Jhazbhay of the University of South
Africa in an interview with Nairobi, Kenya-based Voice of America (VOA)
correspondent Alisha Ryu, despite having a base in neighboring
Djibouti, France obtained permission from Somaliland authorities to
use the abandoned U.S. base at Berbera in the northwestern region of
the republic as the staging area for last week's successful rescue.
According to other sources, the operation also involved the La
Fayette-class light stealth frigate Courbet and two ATL-2 maritime
patrol aircraft. After the raid, the base was used again to transfer
the six captured pirates to an airplane bound for France. The French
appear to have decided to avail themselves of Somaliland President
Dahir Riyale Kahin's coincidental presence in their capital for
consultations to secure the use of a staging ground that was less
likely to jeopardize operational secrecy than Djibouti, where the
one runway at Ambouli International Airport is shared by commercial
traffic, the French military mission, and Camp Lemonier, home of the
America's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). As I
have previously advocated and must repeat again:
The international community needs to formally acknowledge de jure
what is already de facto: the desuetude of "Somalia" as a sovereign
subject of international law. Unitary Somalia is not only dead, but
the carcass of that state has been putrefied; reanimation is no
longer in the realm of possible. To apply Max Weber's thesis, a
government like the TFG that does not even enjoy the monopoly on the
legitimate use of force in its own capital -much less elsewhere in
the territory it claims as its own - is no government at all.
Instead of constantly trying to put the best face on a bad
situation,...the emphasis should be shifted to local Somali entities
which have taken responsibility for governance in their respective
regions.
Fifth, while naval operations can be undertaken to clear the sea
lanes of the pirate menace and commando raids launched to rescue
hostages, the long term security of the waters around the Horn of
Africa requires the development of maritime capacity on the part of
states neighboring the anarchic regions of Somalia. As I suggested
in last week's column, there is a need to for engagement initiatives
like the United States Navy-led Africa Partnership Station (APS),
which strengthens the capacity of partner countries to deal with a
variety of challenges, including piracy, criminal enterprises, and
poaching. However, for most African nations, the scope of their
maritime ambitions and interests is far more modest than those of
the blue-water navies of middle-tier powers, much less those of the
U.S. Navy. In America, functions like maritime safety and law
enforcement, littoral escort, and port security have traditionally
been the primary responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard. Given that,
in terms of mission as well as vessel size, this service is a much
closer match to almost all of Africa's naval forces than most of the
assets of Naval Forces Central Command or the Pacific Fleet which
operate nearby, it would behoove military strategists to consider
how to incorporate the Coast Guard more into their planning for
security in East Africa.
Sixth, even with short-term kinetic operations and long-term
capacity enhancement initiatives, one has to acknowledge that in the
waters off the Horn, there would still remain a not insignificant
gap in maritime security between what assistance the international
community can or will provide and such capacities as African states
(and Yemen) might possess. Might it not be the case that, as I
argued in The National Interest Online last year with respect to
lack of deployable peacekeeping, the international community as a
whole, interested states, or even those with stakes in maritime
transportation ought to at least consider leveraging non-traditional
security resources available within the private sector to fill, at
least provisionally, the security vacuum?
It is bad enough that, Somaliland aside, the lack of an effective,
much less legitimate, government in the territory of the former
Somalia since 1991 has occasioned virtually endless conflict among
the Somali. It is intolerable that the lawlessness should spill over
and threaten the security of neighboring states like Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Yemen, as well as global commerce as a whole, much less
that it should augment the already considerable terrorist challenge.
The time has come for responsible powers in the international
community to develop an integrated strategy to cope with the
worsening piracy, one that begins with declaring open season on the
seaborne marauders whom admiralty law has long branded hostes humani
generis, enemies of mankind.
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